APPENDIX
B: RASHTRIYA SWAYAMSEVAK SANGH: A PRIMER
ORIGINS & IDEOLOGY
RSS is the acronym commonly
used to refer to the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh or National
Volunteer
Corps. The organization was started
in 1925 to specifically ‘revive’ Hindu culture which
was claimed to be under the onslaught of “foreign” cultural
and political influences primarily, Muslims, but also secularists.
The RSS drew ideological inspiration from the (then) recently
triumphant Fascist movement led by Mussolini (the Fasci di Combattimento had
taken power in Italy by 1924). K.B. Hedgewar, the founder of RSS,
was greatly influenced by B.S. Moonje, his mentor, who had traveled
to Italy to meet with Mussolini and study Fascism. Moonje played
a crucial role in molding the RSS along fascist lines and was deeply
impressed by the vision of the fascist organizations. He recorded
in his diary:
The idea of fascism
vividly brings out the conception of unity amongst people...
India and particularly Hindu Indians
need some
such institution for the military regeneration of the Hindus:
so that the artificial distinction so much emphasized by the
British
of martial and non–martial classes amongst the Hindus may
disappear… Our institution of Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
of Nagpur under Dr. Hedgewar is of this kind, though quite independently
conceived. I will spend the rest of my life in developing and
extending this Institution of Dr. Hedgewar all throughout Maharashtra
and
other provinces.86
Ideologically, the RSS
advocates a form of “Hindu nationalism,” which
seeks to establish India as a Hindu Rashtra (Hindu Nation), and
rejects the notion of a composite and pluralist Indian identity
historically developed as a complex synthesis of different cultures
and faiths. This particular ideology has been given various labels
but the term of choice—for all sides—in the current
discourse is Hindutva, literally translated as Hinduness or Hinduhood,
but in reality promoting only a narrow, violent and intolerant
ideology, instead of the diverse and plural streams of faiths that
comprise Hinduism. Hindutva is thus “Hindu chauvinism” based
upon an exclusionary and discriminatory ideology built around a
complex and ingenious definition of “who belongs” or “does
not belong” to the Indian nation. Probably the most explicit
characterization of the question of “belonging” was
provided by the second sarsanghchalak (supreme leader) of the
RSS, M. S. Golwalkar. He writes:
The foreign races in
Hindusthan [India] must either adopt the Hindu culture and
language, must learn to
respect and hold in
reverence Hindu religion, must entertain no idea but those of
the glorification
of the Hindu race and culture, i.e., of the Hindu nation and
must loose (sic) their separate existence to merge in the Hindu
race,
or may stay in the country, wholly subordinated to the Hindu
Nation, claiming nothing, deserving no privileges, far less any
preferential
treatment — not even citizen's rights. There is, at least,
should be, no other course for them to adopt. We are an old nation;
let us deal, as old nations ought to and do deal, with the foreign
races, who have chosen to live in our country.” [emphasis
added]87
Golwalkar’s commentary on who belongs to the Hindu Nation,
apart from its open fascist overtones, is peculiar because it contradicts
the popular understanding of Hinduism as a religion. Instead, it
frames Hinduism as a culture and Hindus as a “race” who
adhere to a Hindu culture. In this peculiar redefinition lies the
specificity of Hindutva’s fascism. It is unlike most of Euro-American
fascism—whether it be Nazism and its notion of Aryan purity
or neo-fascist movements such as the KKK or BNP—which are
all biologically defined ideas of racial purity. Hindutva’s
cultural basis seems to remove it from such standard forms of fascism.
However, the equation of race with culture – as in Golwalkar’s “Hindu
race and culture” – introduces a notion of purity
and natural difference through the back door. Lochtefeld (1996),
analyzing
Savarkar, the man who was one of the fathers of the RSS, unpacks
this redefinition as follows:
Savarkar [who first
expounded on the Hindu Nation] defined a Hindu as anyone
regarding India as a fatherland and
holy land,
and to
this day these remain the litmus test. This defines the Hindu
nation on cultural criteria—as a people united by a common
cultural heritage—and from the start Hindutva proponents
have insisted that the word ‘Hindu’ refers to a cultural
rather than a religious community…. One must look at who
this definition excludes. Savarkar’s definition of a Hindu
is plastic enough to include everyone in a notoriously polyform
tradition, but the
condition that one regard India as the Holy Land largely excludes
both Muslims and Christians. This definition equates Hindu identity
and Indian nationalism, meaning that religious minorities are
not only ‘aliens’, but because of their ‘extraterritorial
loyalties’ (to holy lands in Arabia and Israel), they are
also potential traitors.”88
The ingenuity of tying
culture and race together is that it makes possible a definition
of a “pure” nation where none
is otherwise possible. By defining “belonging” through
a territorially contained notion of culture, it becomes possible
to denote some minorities as within the ambit of “the Hindu” and
others as outside it. A large number of minorities —Sikhs,
Buddhists and Jains, for instance—are objects of integration.
So also, Dalits and adivasis (tribals), though historically oppressed
by caste Hindus, are in this definition not excluded from the nation.
The idea here is to redefine these minorities as “Hindu”—where
a certain specific upper caste Hinduism (Sanatana Dharma), is the
hegemonic pure form—and all others are at varying distance
from this purity. In contrast, Muslims, Christians, Parsis and
Jews, are clearly defined as outside the fold of the nation—despite
their having been part of India for millennia—because their
cultural signifiers are constructed by Hindutva as being external
to the territorial nation assumed to be fundamentally and originally
Hindu.
The definition of “pure” is what aligns Hindutva with
classical fascism of the Nazi kind. Clearly inspired and convinced
by the Nazi experiment of attempting to purge a land of all those
who don’t fit into a definition of German-Aryan purity,
Golwalkar writes:
German national pride
has now become the topic of the day. To keep up the purity
of the nation and its culture,
Germany shocked
the world by her purging the country of the Semitic races — the
Jews. National pride at its highest has been manifested here. Germany
has also shown how well–nigh impossible it is for races
and cultures, having differences going to the root, to be assimilated
into one united whole, a good lesson for us in Hindustan to learn
and profit by.89
Clearly then, the Sangh’s ideology is simultaneously a modern
Indian and European mix. The Sangh’s broad ideas of purity
and exclusion are not very different from Nazism and their vision
of society is a virtual replica of Fascism. However, the peculiar
conflation of culture and race does make this brand of Nazism/Fascism
unique. Some commentators have also noted the parallels in behavior
and operation between the RSS and the Taliban, and have coined
the term “Vedic Taliban” as an appropriate contemporary
way to refer to the RSS.
THE SANGH AND VIOLENCE
Violence is a core aspect
of the Sangh’s Hindutva ideology.
The RSS has never been shy of advocating violence for the achievement
of its goals of a Hindu Rashtra. With a history of inciting and
conducting violent campaigns going back to the partition of India
and Pakistan, there is no greater exemplar of Hindutva as a fundamentally
violent movement than the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi: on January
30, 1948, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi was shot dead by Nathuram
Godse, a prominent Hindutva exponent. After Gandhi’s murder,
the RSS made many public denials of its association of Godse,
but the falsity of these denials is clear from many associated
facts:
Godse’s assassination of Gandhi was not the first but the
sixth attempt on Gandhi’s life by the Hindutva movement.90 The
thesis that Godse was an exception and a misguided young man marginally
associated with Hindutva, fades in light of this history
of attempts from within the movement. The reaction of the RSS to
the murder of Gandhi was one of open elation: RSS members celebrated
openly on the streets. Even the then Home Minister of India, Sardar
Vallabhbhai Patel, who was not entirely unsympathetic to the RSS,
felt compelled to express his disgust to the then RSS supremo,
M.S. Golwalkar, in a letter dated September 11, 1948:91
As a final result of the poison, the country had to suffer the
sacrifice of the invaluable life of Gandhiji. Even an iota of the
sympathy of the Government or of the people no more remained for
the RSS. In fact, opposition grew. Opposition turned more severe
when the RSS men expressed joy and distributed sweets after Gandhiji's
death.
Years later, Gopal Godse,
one of the co-accused in the Gandhi murder case and Nathuram
Godse’s brother,
confirmed that both he and his brother were actively involved
with the RSS at
the time of the assassination. In an interview in 1994, he stated:92
All the brothers were in the RSS. Nathuram, Dattatreya, myself
and Govind. You can say we grew up in the RSS rather than in our
home. It was like a family to us. Nathuram had become a baudhik
karyavah [intellectual worker] in the RSS. He has said in his statement
that he had left the RSS. He said it because Golwalkar [the then
RSS Supremo] and the RSS were in a lot of trouble after the murder
of Gandhi. But he did not leave the RSS.93
So Hindutva, which began
its work in a newly independent India with the murder of an
apostle of peace
and respect for all communities,
has today surfaced in its open and naked form—as a fundamentally
fascist movement. It depicts Hinduism as constantly under threat
from external, foreign forces (of Islam, Christianity and Secularism),
and hence, portrays violence against Muslims, Christians and advocates
of pluralism in India as a form of self-defense. This “self
defense” is further positioned as the process of regeneration
of Hindu manhood. This twin trope of “self-defense” and “lost
manhood” that is in need of recovery are part of the daily
rhetoric of Hindutva. This psychological justification of violence
is under-girded by a more open strategic and essential appreciation
of violence, whether it be Golwalkar’s open appreciation
for the efforts of the Nazis in Germany towards “purging
the country of the Semitic races—the Jews,” or Moonje’s
hope that the RSS would create conditions of a “military
regeneration of Hindus”, and prepare “our boys in
the game of killing masses of people.”94 Violence for the Sangh
is clearly essential to ensure that the minorities live in fear
and seek no privileges of citizenship.
There is ample evidence that this essential and strategic understanding
of violence is central to the Hindutva project. Numerous government
reports have clearly indicted the Sangh for fomenting communal
violence.95 Violence for the RSS
is part of a strategy of destroying an integrated multi-religious
society and creating polarized communities
of Hindus, Muslims and Christians. In a recent film on the RSS, “Men
in the Tree,” filmmaker Lalit Vachani records a series
of critical interviews with former RSS members. These men speak
openly
of how it was part of their work as RSS swayamsevaks (volunteers)
to create and spread rumors that would produce conditions conducive
for a communal riot. The gradual but continuous polarization
of the religious communities through violence is a fundamental
fact
of the Sangh strategy.
As the RSS has grown more powerful and gained legislative power
through its political wing, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), its
strategic use of state power and riots to polarize religious communities
has started the process of fundamentally destroying and displacing
minority communities. Religious violence in India is no longer
mobs fighting in the streets, as unfortunate as that was, but is
increasingly taking the form of organized pogroms to eliminate
and reduce minority communities to rubble. In 1998, when the BJP-led
coalition formed the Central Government, attacks against Christian
communities escalated significantly.96 But Gujarat 2002 marks the
most vicious, brutal and meticulously planned Sangh-led pogrom
against the minorities. Starting on February 28, 2004, and continuing
for months afterwards, the Sangh orchestrated the massacre of close
to 2000 Muslims, while over 150,000 Muslims were made homeless,
thousands of Muslim women raped, mutilated and killed, and Muslim
businesses specifically targeted, destroyed and annexed. The BJP
state government not only did nothing to protect its minority citizenry;
it actively colluded with the killers. Numerous autonomous human
rights groups have documented the genocide and the Sangh involvement
in it. According to the Human Right Watch:
The groups most directly
involved in the violence against Muslims include the Vishwa
Hindu Parishad (World Hindu
Council, VHP),
the Bajrang Dal, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and the Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP) that heads the Gujarat state government.
Collectively,
they are known as the sangh parivar, or family of Hindu nationalist
organizations. … Numerous police reports filed by eyewitnesses
after the attacks have specifically named local VHP, BJP, and
Bajrang Dal leaders as instigators or participants in the violence.97
THE INSTITUTIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE OF HINDUTVA
As an organization, the
RSS is elusive and shadowy—it is
only open to Hindu males, it maintains no membership records, it
has resisted being registered with the government of India as a
public/charitable trust, it has no known bank accounts and does
not file tax returns. The RSS functions primarily through hundreds
of front organizations, organizations that cover a broad range
and exist in every facet of sociopolitical life not only in India,
but increasingly also among the diaspora. Although these organizations
claim to be independent of the Sangh, they are all supervised by
volunteers from the Sangh and centrally coordinated. While the
RSS itself cannot currently accept monetary contributions for its
activities from abroad, each of the Sangh-affiliated organizations
has been designated a ‘charity’ and the Sangh actively
solicits funding for these organizations. Given that the RSS has
no corporate form and ensures an ambiguity around its form and
function, it would be quite correct to argue that this myriad of
smaller organizations together is what precisely constitutes the
RSS. This ‘family’ of organizations is collectively
referred to as the Sangh Parivar, or simply as the Sangh. Details
of the visible structure of the Sangh Parivar and its chief constituent
organizations can be found elsewhere so we only provide a summary
here.
The core unit of the
RSS is referred to as a shakha (literally “branch,” but
better understood as a cell). The shakha is a place for RSS swayamsevaks
(volunteers) to come together for physical and ideological training.
These shakhas operate in tens of thousands of neighborhoods in
India (and increasingly in the U.S. and the U.K.) and serve as
the primary source of recruits who can then be molded to become
the foot-soldiers for the Sangh’s projects and organizations.
Here too, specific links can be drawn between European fascism
and the RSS. B. S. Moonje, the mentor of Hedgewar, the founding
father of the RSS, visited and met with Mussolini and was granted
permission by Mussolini to observe and understand the nature
of the fascist organizational structure.98
Moonje’s central concern while looking at Italian fascism
was, as he says, with the aim of “developing and extending
this Institution.” Thus the RSS cell structure of shakhas
grew with some clear similarity to the cell structure of Mussolini’s
Black Shirts (the militant arm of the Fasci di combattimento, largely
comprised of youth), borrowing with it the core ideas of physical
training of youth and militarism. Moonje’s writings are
very explicit in acknowledging the centrality of violent militarism
to the RSS strategy. In his preface to The Scheme of the Central
Hindu Military Society and its Military School, he declared:
This training is meant for qualifying and fitting our boys for
the game of killing masses of men with the ambition of winning
victory with the best possible causalities (sic) of dead and wounded
while causing the utmost possible to the adversary.99,100
The army of swayamsevaks
deployed by the Sangh carries out the spread of the Hindutva
ideology in
India at the grassroots level.
The recruitment and ideological orientation towards Hindutva
is done on many levels and fronts: at the grade school
level, or earlier,
with Hinduised education, including such activities as the
holding of Ramayan and Mahabharat competitions for school
children in tribal
areas—largely with the goal of supplanting tribal culture
and traditions, with the forced ‘celebration’ of
Hindu festivals on a grand scale in areas with large non-Hindu
populations,
and simultaneously with the distribution of anti-minority pamphlets
and literature, and finally with more direct action such as
the grabbing of minority-owned land or property and the incitement
of riots and murder.
The swayamsevaks generated
at the Shakhas are seamlessly tied into the Sangh Parivar infrastructure.
Swayamsevaks go on to direct
and run, projects of every size and shape – from the Seva
Vibhag (service wing) operations such as Sewa Bharati, Ekal Vidyalayas
and Vanvasi Kalyan Ashrams to Bal Vihars (children’s centers)
to opening up new shakhas, from student politics through the
Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP) to national politics
through
the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), from religious militancy through
the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) to organized mob violence through
terrorist/paramilitary groups such as the Bajrang Dal.
Most of these institutions
also have an equivalent organization in the US; the RSS has
its image mirrored
through the HSS, the
BJP in the OFBJP, the VHP in the VHP of America, its student
wing the ABVP in HSC, the Bajrang Dal in Hindu Unity, and
the Seva Vibhag
in organizations such as the IDRF. Over the last three decades,
and accelerating over the last decade and a half—coincident
with the BJP’s rise in electoral politics in India—the
Sangh Parivar has expanded its operations outside India and made
significant efforts to reach the ‘Hindu’ diaspora,
especially in the US, the UK and the Caribbean.
Below is a brief description
of the major components of the Sangh Parivar—the Indian
organization first, followed by its US equivalent. The chart
(figure
1) following the summary below provides
a visual representation of the Sangh structure.
RSS: The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh is the core fount of Hindutva
Ideology.
HSS: The Hindu Swayamsevak Sangh is
the US equivalent of the RSS. The HSS is registered as
a tax-exempt charity in the US, and like
the RSS in India, is one of the main proponents of Hindutva in
the US. According to one of its flyers, “HSS is [sic] started
in the USA and other parts of the world to continue what RSS
is doing in India.”101 The
RSS website states that the primary purpose of the HSS is to
protect the children of Hindu parents
from the “vicious propaganda and corrupt conversion techniques
of Christians and Muslims.”102 Note
the central concern of diasporic life in this definition is the
possible “impurity” of
Christian or Islamic influence. Much like the RSS branches in
India, HSS also holds physical and ideological training sessions
and camps.
The structure of the RSS is duplicated in the US, with the Sanghchalak
of the HSS being the highest office bearer in the US.
BJP: The Bharatiya Janata Party is the political arm of the Sangh
Parivar that participates in electoral politics. It is currently
in power in the Indian state of Gujarat, which recently witnessed
some of the most gruesome violence against Muslims. At the center
in New Delhi, it was the leading member of the coalition that was
in power until it lost in the national elections in India in early
2004 (but still managed to retain the second largest number of
seats in the Parliament of India).
OFBJP: The Overseas Friends of BJP is the BJP support group in
the US. While it cannot monetarily support the BJP directly from
the US, many OFBJP functionaries work with other Sangh operations
in the US to propagate Hindutva. In addition, it works to mobilize
opinion in Washington D.C and invites BJP leadership from India
to the US to meet with the Indian Diaspora.
VHP: The Vishwa Hindu Parishad was
formed in 1964 with the explicit purpose of forming an
aggressive and an activist wing to promote
Hindutva. The first general secretary of the VHP, S.S. Apte,
made its goals clear as follows: “It is therefore necessary in
this age of competition and conflict to think of, and organize,
the Hindu world to save itself from the evil eyes of all three” [all
three being Christianity, Islam and Communism].103 Since
its formation, the VHP has played an aggressive and agitational
role in India.
It rose to prominence for spearheading—from the early 1980s
onwards—the so-called Ram Janmabhoomi movement that ultimately
led to the violent take over and destruction of the 16th century
Babri mosque in the town of Ayodhya in the northern Indian state
of Uttar Pradesh, followed by nationwide celebratory rioting by
elements of the Sangh that resulted in the killing of several thousand
Muslims. More recently, the VHP’s international working president,
Mr. Ashok Singhal, called the carnage against Muslims in Gujarat
a “successful experiment” and warned that it would
be repeated all over India.104 The VHP thus functions as the arm of
the Sangh that directly creates and spreads conditions of religious
intolerance and violence.
VHPA: The VHP of America is
the US counterpart of the VHP in India, and has many chapters
in large parts of the North East and the
South with the primary function of support work for the Sangh
in India among the professional Indian diaspora. It also
spawned the
Hindu Students Council (HSC), a student organization with significant
presence on American university campuses (facing global condemnation
in the aftermath of the carnage in Gujarat, and likely in an
attempt to build in some legal distance, HSC was spun off
as a separate
entity in early 2003). Its work within the professional Indian
diasporic community is essentially both ideological and fund
raising. Though it claims to be independent of the VHP
itself, this is at
best a technical legal distinction. In real terms it works actively
and in close cooperation with VHP, India. For instance, VHPA’s
biggest event to date in the US was the World Vision 2000, a
conference organized in Washington D.C. The guest list for that
event included
nearly every luminary in the VHP India hierarchy. In addition,
the VHPA promotes fund collection for a range of Sewa Vibhag
activity in India.105
Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP): This
is the youth wing of the Sangh, operating throughout university
campuses in India.
It takes active part in student body elections at universities,
vigorously propagating the Sangh’s hate ideology on college
campuses. ABVP provides a space where the future VHP and RSS leadership
is groomed and mentored—Narendra Modi, the current Gujarat
state Chief Minister, also referred to as the Butcher of Gujarat
for his role during the 2002 Gujarat genocide, was a prominent
leader of the ABVP before being inducted into the RSS and BJP.106 ABVP has a reputation for violence, vituperation and hooliganism,
and is often used by the Sangh to disrupt progressive events on
campuses, carry out moral policing and enforce a socially conservative
agenda in universities.
Hindu Students Council (HSC):
Launched initially by the VHP of America, this is now officially
an autonomous organization with
branches in many universities across the US. While attempting
to distance itself from the Sangh, HSC actively promotes
the Sangh’s
ideology under the guise of liberal Hindu socio-religious thought.
It works primarily with second generation Indian Americans with
a project of bringing them under the influence of Hindutva. It
serves to introduce the concepts of Hindutva in university spaces,
mobilize the diasporic student population around the issues of
an embattled Hindu identity and legitimize the Sangh family of
organizations as valid representatives of the Hindu diasporic
community.
Bajrang Dal is
the paramilitary wing of the VHP, and was started in 1984 to
provide muscle
and manpower to the VHP agitations. The
Bajrang Dal regularly organizes arms training camps for its members,
where it teaches them the use of firearms and trishuls (tridents).
According to one of the participants, the training is imparted
in order to teach them “how to beat those who do not respect
Hinduism.”107 Bajrang Dal has been at the forefront of recent
communal attacks against Christians in the tribal regions, against
artists and intellectuals and against Muslims in Gujarat.
HinduUnity.org is a US and Israel-based website that claims to
be the official website of the Bajrang Dal. This site is a virulent
hate-filled site that has already once been yanked by a web-hosting
service because of the venom that it spews, and its frequent calls
to violence against specific individuals and against Muslims in
general. A typical passage from the Website under the pop-up window
called Hindu Force is given below as a sample:
Revenge on Islam must become the sole aim of the life of every
Hindu today. Islam has been shedding Hindu blood for several centuries.
This is something we should neither forget nor forgive. This sinister
religion has been striking at Hinduism for just too long. It is
time we resist this satanic force and kick it back into the same
pit it crawled out of.
Seva Vibhag: The
Service Wing of the Hindutva Movement is the RSS’s most incoherent structure. However, in its very incoherence
lies its ingenuity. The service wing operates through hundreds
of organizations spread across the country—many different
names and functions—all presented as if they were entirely
independent organizations. This proliferation of Seva Vibhag projects
as different organizations gives an impression of seeming independence,
however, it is also the most inconspicuous way of placing swayamsevaks
distributed across the country and creating entry points for them
to do their ideological work. Often it is difficult to place an
organization as an RSS Seva Vibhag operation. It takes systematic
matching of organizational trustees with other known RSS operations
to establish the links. The role of the Seva Vibhag as an entry
point to do the core ideological work of the Sangh creates some
long term patterns and institutions. For instance, education offers
an effective cover for ideological work and the remaking of identities.
Thus many Seva Vibhag operations are crafted as educational activities.
Following such patterns it becomes possible to identify Vidya Bharati
as an RSS operation. Similarly, it becomes possible to identify
a whole range of organizations that work with tribals (adivasis)
as RSS operations because the adivasis are an important target
constituency for the RSS. These multitude of projects, besides
doing the core work of spreading the ideology of the Sangh, also
serve as conduits for the collection of funds from India and from
the diaspora under the guise of “development” and “relief.”
India Development and Relief Fund (IDRF): IDRF is the US based
funding arm of the Sangh and primarily funds the Sangh through
its Seva Vibhag operations. IDRF claims to have no formal relationship
with the Sangh, but an overwhelming majority of the money raised
by it is earmarked for Sangh programs in India.108 Given that money
raised from the diasporic Indian community is critical for sustaining
the Sangh operations in India, it is not surprising to note the
prominent place that IDRF enjoys in the Sangh hierarchy in the
US. It is closely associated with all Sangh Parivar outposts in
the US; office bearers at VHPA, OFBJP, HSS and HSC are also intimately
engaged with the running of IDRF, and all these groups have raised
money for IDRF at different occasions. IDRF is directly connected
to Sewa International, the part of the Seva Vibhag that coordinates
international Seva activity.
THE SANGH PARIVAR {AND THE US EQUIVALENTS}

Figure
1 – Organization
Chart of the Sangh Parivar
Endnotes:
[86]
M. Casolari, (1993) Hindutva’s foreign tie-up in the 1930s: Archival
Evidence, Economic and Political Weekly, Jan 22, 2000. http://www.sacw.net/DC/CommunalismCollection/ArticlesArchive/casolari.pdf (archive)
[87] We or Our Nationhood Defined, Golwalkar, 1939, pp. 47-48
[88] James G. Lochtefeld (1996) New Wine, Old Skins: The Sangh Parivar and the Transformation of Hinduism, Religion 26, 101-118
[89] We or Our Nationhood Defined, MS Golwalkar, 1939.
[90] Murder of The Mahatma, Tushar Gandhi (web) (archive)
[91]
A Law Unto Itself, AG Noorani, Frontline, Volume 15 (17), Aug
15-22, 1998 http://www.flonnet.com/fl1517/15171170.htm (archive)
[92]
Frontline, January 28, 1994 quoted in The RSS and the BJP: A
Division of Labour, AG Noorani, Leftword Books, 2000 p. 30 http://www.sabrang.com/gujarat/rssbible.htm (archive)
[93]
See also Vinay Lal’s, Nathuram Godse, the RSS, and the
Murder of Gandhi http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/southasia/History/Hindu_Rashtra/nathuram.html (archive)
[94]
See footnote #86
[95]
A Half Century’s
Gory Record, AG Noorani, The Statesman, Jan 15, 2000 (web) (archive)
[96] Politics by Other Means: Attacks Against Christians in India, Human Rights Watch Report, Sep 1999 http://www.hrw.org/press/1999/sep/christians.htm
[97] India: Gujarat Officials Took Part in Anti-Muslim Violence: Press Release by HRW, Apr 30, 2002 http://hrw.org/press/2002/04/gujarat.htm
[98] See footnote #86.
[99] Ibid.
[100]
The anti-Muslim pogroms in Gujarat in early 2002 are just the latest
example of how 70 years after Moonje’s pronouncement, the Sangh
continues to play this “game of killing masses of men.”
[101] See (web) (archive)
[102]
See http://web.archive.org/web/20020218172331/http://www.rss.org/rssstor.htm under
the subtitle ‘Towards Maintaining Cultural Identity’ (archive)
[103] The Organiser, Diwali Special, 1964.
[104] ‘We’ll
repeat our Gujarat experiment’ Indian
Express, Sep, 2002 http://www.indianexpress.com/full_story.php?content_id=8831 (archive)
[105]
James G. Lochtefeld (1996) New Wine, Old Skins: The Sangh Parivar and
the Transformation of Hinduism, Religion 26, 101-118.
[106]
See Narendra Modi’s profile at http://web.archive.org/web/20031021010553/http://profile.narendramodi.org/ (archive)
[107]
Bajrang Dal activists take up arms, The Times of India, Jun 13,
2001 http://www.hinduunity.org/bajrangdal.html (archive)
[108] See footnote #56.
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